City University of New York (CUNY)

CUNY Academic Works
Dissertations and Theses

City College of New York

2011

Neofunctionalism Vs Liberal Intergovernmentalism; The Creation
Of The European Stability Mechanism And The Limits Of Political
Theory
Holger Scheidt
CUNY City College

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cc_etds_theses/108
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY).
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu

Neofunctionalism Vs Liberal Intergovernmentalism: The
Creation Of The European Stability Mechanism And The
Limits Of Political Theory

Holger Scheidt

06/2011

Master’s Thesis
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements fort he Degree of Master of
International Affairs at the City College of New York

Advisor: Professor Bruce Cronin, PhD

1

Table of Contents
Chapter 1
Introduction.................................................................................................5
Supranationalism.........................................................................................6
State Centrism.............................................................................................8
Research Design..........................................................................................11
Chapter 2
An Overview of the EU Institutional Framework.......................................13
A Brief History of EMU..............................................................................18
Chronology of Events Leading
To the Creation of ESM...............................................................................23
Institutional Outcome...................................................................................30
Chapter 3
Supranational Agency..................................................................................33
Intergovernmental Bargaining......................................................................37
The German Position....................................................................................39
The French Position......................................................................................42
National Preferences.....................................................................................43
Incremental, Endogenous Process................................................................46
External Shocks and Events..........................................................................49
Chapter 4
Conclusion.....................................................................................................52
The Future.....................................................................................................63

2

Abstract
The aim of this study is to determine the expanatory and predictive value of the two
predominant schools of thought on state integration, namely neofunctionalism and
liberal intergovernmentalism, of supranationalist or state-centric theory, with respect
to the creation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the "Pact for the
Euro" on March 25, 2011 in Brussels.
After a 14-month long period of great controversy among the supranational agents
of the European Commission and the representatives of member states of the
Economic and Monatery Union (EMU) during 2010, the European Council
established a permanent mechanism, which is supposed to grant the stability of the
common currency. On the one hand there is the ESM, which allows for a
redistribution of funds within the EMU in order to bolster indebted member states’
(such as Greece, Portugal, Ireland) fiscal portfolios, and which enhances the
automatism of early sanctions imposed by the European Commission in order to more
effectively enforce the "convergence criteria" as formulated by the Stability and
Growth Pact (SGP). On the other hand there is the "Pact for the Euro", which
represents a permanent intergovernmental conference of EMU and other EU member
states aiming for the harmonization of inner-European economic and fiscal policy.
This study provides for an analysis of the political process leading to the creation of
this new piece of European legislation on the one hand, and on the other of the precise
institutional outcome according to the two theories’ assumptions and explanatory
mechanisms.
The fact, that the political process was decisively influenced by supranational
agency as much as intergovernmental bargaing, and further, that "spillover" was
absent, that issue-specific interests were divergent rather than convergent lead to the
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conclusion, that both of the theories are only partly fit to account for the process as
much as the outcome. This potential step toward de facto economic union and
integrated fiscal policy was caused by an external shock, and can therefore hardly be
described as incremental. Yet on the other hand, it also represents the consequence of
an endogenous process perpetuating a compromise between the parties of the
traditional debate among monetarists and economists, which is built on the procedural
parallelity of immediate further monetary integration and the harmonization of innerEuropean economic and fiscal policy.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
In the year of 2010, a new chapter has been added to the history of the integration of
European states. After great debate and controversy among the members of the
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which represents the very core of European
integration, states decided to abandon fundamental rules of the existing treaty work,
and to provide financial assistance to indebted members on the brink of insolvency.
A financial umbrella, a rescue fund of 500 billion Euros, was created by EMU
members pooling state funds under the name of the European Financial Stability
Facility (EFSF). It was designed to not only provide funds to Greece, and later
Ireland, but to also bolster the portfolios of Spain, and Portugal, and to safeguard the
imperiled common currency as a whole. The total sum of the fund of EU financial
support was raised to 700 billion Euro with the creation of the permanent European
Stability Mechanism (ESM) in March 2011.
The conflict, which became apparent among especially French and German
governments over this issue represented probably the most serious stress on both
states’ relationship since the unification of Germany in 1990. While the French
government quickly took position alongside the European Commission for financial
aid within the Union, the German government objected and found itself in opposition
to the European Commission on the one hand, and the government of the decisive
EMU member state of France on the other.
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP, adopted in 1996) represents the common
framework for states’ economic performance and formulates convergence criteria
which states are supposed to meet in order to secure the stability of the common
currency and the economic welfare of the Union. However, the efficiency of this pact
had been in doubt: the sanctioning mechanisms had not functioned, and convergence
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was volatile, especially since the two most potent member states, namely Germany
and France failed to meet criteria in 2003. During the recent Euro crisis it became
apparent that a further integration of European economic and fiscal policy, and a
harmonization of European economic capability across the EU would be
indispensable in order to grant for stability and in order to preserve EMU in its
present form.
The installation of a permanent mechanism to, on the one hand, support indebted
member states through the ESM, and, on the other, to level out macroeconomic
imbalances within the Union is a de facto step away from original EMU legislation.
The pooling of such substantive treasure of member states for a common purpose has
fueled renewed debate over the necessity of tightened compliance mechanisms, a
tightened SGP, and extended delegation of national domains to EU authorities.
The aim of my study is to determine whether state-centric or rather supranationalist
approaches are more fit to explain this new dynamic within the EMU.
In order to approach the question as to whether intergovernmentalist or
neofunctionalist schools of thought are best fit to explain this recent European
process, whether supranationalism or state-centrism represent the determining factors
in this particular integrative step, I would now like to turn to an overview of those
respective schools.
Supranationalism
Supranationalism defines a genre of political thought, which identifies state
integration as a process undermining national sovereignty and aiming to the
establishment of a greater structure organized by authority beyond national state
governments.
Neofunctionalism:
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Neofunctionalism was initially formulated by Ernst Haas in 19581 (Leon Lindberg
is also a renowned proponent of this supranational school of thought), and was very
influential in the early days of European integration.
The theory holds that state integration is brought about by the entrepreneurship of
supranational agents, who engage states in the pooling of sovereignty on issues of
common interest, thereby creating continuous so-called "spillovers" to related policy
areas, which function as a motor to integration fueled by transnational socioeconomic synergies. In consistence with the theory the idea of the "ever closer
union"2 identified an irreversible process of states increasingly rendering sovereignty
to supranational bodies, which take on a life and political ambitions of their own,
while national governments incrementally lose sovereignty also due to unintended
outcomes of previous decisions. The Treaty of Rome creating the European Economic
Community, extending the ECSC and Euratom to a common market, serves as the
most supportive piece of evidence for the claim of neofunctionalism.
However setbacks in the process of European integration soon led Haas to abandon
initial assertiveness about the automatism of neofunctionalism.
Conceding to criticism with respect to the lack of explanatory capacity, Haas
continued to argue for the macro-foundational value of the theory: "Neofunctionalists
rely on the primacy of incremental decision-making over grand design"3. He however
acknowledges the notion, that neofunctionalism is limited with regards to precise
measurement of successful or non-successful integration, "Neo-functionalists do not
agree on a dependent variable"4. European supranational entrepreneurship, especially

1

Ernst B. Haas, „The Uniting of Europe“, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958
The Treaty of Rome, Rome, 1957
3
Ernst B. Haas, „The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and
Anguish of Pretheorizing“, International Organization 24, no 4 (1970), p. 627
4
Haas, 1970, p. 628
2
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represented institutionally by the European Commission, has played a great role in the
process of European integration. Supranational bodies and structures, such as the
Central European Bank (CEB), the European Court of Justice (ECJ), or also the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) have assumed great significance for
national policy makers. Yet, the history of this process also provides for much
evidence on the great impact of member states’ individual interests. Now, after the
Treaty of Lisbon, which represents the status of legal European integration, member
states’ direct impact on the institutional framework and political reality of the EU
continues to be at the center of day-to-day decision making.
What theory is it then, that best explains the recent and current events within EMU.
Supranational Grand design? Or state centric procedural analysis?
State-Centrism
State-Centrism refers to schools of thought which define state integration as
institutionalized cooperation and harmonization of national policy on the basis of
negotiation among states essentially retaining national sovereignty.
Intergovernmentalism:
Intergovernmentalism was intially formulated by Stanley Hoffman5. Hoffman
rejected the idea, that supranationalism is an automatic mechanism to integration
caused by economic interests, and held, that states continue to control the process of
European integration. On the grounds of the assumption, that nation states will
continue to promote national interest and generally reject the delegation of
sovereignty, he argued, that the integration of European security and defense policy
would not happen.

5

Stanley Hoffmann, The State of War: Essays on the Theory and Practice of
International Politics, New York: Praeger, 1965
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The Three Pillar System, established by the Treaty of Maastricht confirms
Hoffmann’s approach. While "Communities" matters involved supranational bodies,
security, defense as much as judicial and police matters were decided upon
exclusively by intergovernmental procedures. Very recent events and controversy
regarding the intervention in Libya in 2011 provide evidence for the continuous
relevance of Hoffmann’s conclusion.
However the central claim of state-centric scholars such as Hoffmann, that states do
not cede sovereignty, has increasingly lost support in observable evidence, especially
in the context of qualified majority voting (QMV) procedures within principal
intergovernmental bodies which abolish single member states’ right to veto. QMV has
assumed much greater scope and application since the Treaty of Amsterdam, and the
Treaty of Lisbon in particular. About two thirds of all policy matters are decided upon
via QMV. In addition, the significance of the European supranational judicial system
has become quite substantial to national political processes.
Andrew Moravcsik’s Liberal Intergovernmentalism represents the result of a
revision of intergovernmentalism as a theoretical approach to European integration.
Liberal Intergovernmentalism:
Moravcsik perpetuates a state-centric perspective on integrative processes, and yet
seeks to incorporate transnational economic factors. He criticizes Haas’s lack of
microfoundation and neofunctionalism’s lack of responsiveness to external events. He
establishes three explanatory variables based on the proposition of Alan Milward:
"a) national preferences develop in response to exogenuous changes in the nature of
issue-specific functional interdependence, b) interstate negotiation proceeds on the
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basis of relative bargaining power, c) delegation to supranational institutions is
designed to facilitate credible commitments."6
Liberal intergovernmentalism seeks to incorporate the acknowledgement of intraand transnational socio-economic dynamics, which neofunctionalists identified as the
basis for spillover effects. These dynamics, which in LI theory can be caused or by
external or internal circumstances, determine states’ interest, and integrative outcomes
are produced by intergovernmental negotiations. Supranational bodies, from a liberal
intergovernmentalist point of view, represent the final product of the process, rather
than the motor. Integration is not achieved by spillover, but rather "convergent
interests" of negotiating states.
Since the introduction and extension of QMV procedures to intergovernmental
processes within the EU, bargaining power has gained in political momentum.
According to Moravcsik, in addition to "asymmetric interdependence"3 as a basis for
bargaining, it has assumed new determining factors such as coalition building within
intergovernmental bodies.
Although Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism has been accredited as the
most comprehensive explanatory model for state integration, the question remains:
How can successful integration best be accounted for? The recent developments in
EMU represent a formidable case in order to investigate the mechanisms at work of
this new, potentially fundamental step in European integration, and may allow us to
enrich the conversation about either supranationalism or state-centrism delivering on
the dependent variable, which is European integration.

6

Andrew Moravcsik, „The European Constitutional Compromise and the
neofunctionalist legacy“, Journal of European Public Policy, no 2 (2005), p. 359
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Research Design
I claim, that both theoretical approaches, neofunctionalism as much as liberal
intergovernmentalism, are only partly fit to account for the political process leading to
the creation of ESM on the one hand, and the precise institutional outcome on the
other. Yet, while liberal intergovernmentalism, in this case, fails to live up to its
promise of superior explanatory value with respect to process as much as outcome,
neofunctionalism due to its macrofoundational understanding of the process retains a
certain predictive value, although it partly fails to explain the process and entirely to
predict the precise institutional outcome.
While the theoretic framework of this study, as outlined above, relies on seminal
literature, I will acquire the relevant data for the research project mainly from
newspaper articles, television news, interviews and institutions’ official publications
as much as secondary sources, such as journal articles and books.
On the one hand, it will be necessary to look at data on supranational bodies’
involvement in the process as much as in the precise institutional design, actors such
as the European Commission and the CEB, and on the other, data on controversial
political processes among member states. As anticipated in the introduction, the
process leading to the creation of ESM and "the Pact for the Euro" was greatly
characterized by a memorable controversy within the so-called axis Paris-Berlin. The
relationship of France and Germany had ever since the foundation of the European
Coal and Steel Community had a central significance for the process of European
integration, and both nations represent the greatest contributors to ESM today.
Contrasting the positions and actions of France and Germany in the process will
therefore be of particular interest.
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In Chapter 2, I will first provide an overview of the evolution of the EU’s
institutional framework with a focus on the relation between supranational and
intergovernmental elements determining integrative treaty work.

I will further

provide for a brief history of EMU, which the ESM is a feature of.
This data will be presented with a focus on evidence on the two contrasting theories
in preparation of the later analysis. I will then go into greater detail documenting the
chronology of events that led to the creation of ESM and the "Pact for the Euro" on
March, 25, 2011.This substantial historical account is necessary to be able to
understand the political process leading to the creation of ESM as much as the
meaning of its precise institutional design.
In the following analysis, in Chapter 3, I will seek to interpret data according to
key

paradigms

of

the

contrasting

theories,

neofunctionalism

and

liberal

intergovernmentsalism:
I will seek to find evidence on the impact of supranational agency and national
interests in the context of intergovernmental bargaining as determining factors on the
creation of ESM and the "Pact for the Euro". I will further investigate this step in
European integration as an incremental, endogenous process, and/or as a reaction to
external shocks and events. In order to accomplish this, I will find evidence on the
explanatory mechanisms of both theories, such as on the impact of spillover, or on the
development and impact of convergent interests on the institutional outcome.
This procedure should allow me to understand the dynamics of the political process
leading to the creation of ESM and the "Pact for the Euro", and to determine in
conclusion, whether supranationalism or state-centrism represents the best approach
to account for the process and/or the institutional outcome.
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Chapter 2
Supranationalism vs State-centrism Overview Of The EU Institutional Framework
The institutional framework of the European Union comprises supranational as
much as intergovernmental elements and reflects two theoretical approaches to the
phenomenon

of

state

integration,

namely,

neo-functionalism

and

intergovernmentalism. Decision-making procedures within the EU vary according to
the policy area in question, and the involvement of the different institutions in their
relation to each other changes with the issue at hand. Up until the adoption of the
Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, supranational instititutions in general assumed their primary
relevance with respect to issue areas that fell under what was known as the first of
three pillars, the European Communities Pillar.
The first European Community was founded in 1951 among six members, namely,
France, Germany, Belgium, Luxemburg, Netherlands and Italy with the Treaty of
Paris. Modelled after the so-called "Schuman Plan", which had been formulated by
the French foreign minister Robert Schuman, the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC) was created. The ECSC’s primary objective was to integrate
French and German heavy industry along the rivers Rhine and Ruhr, which had
represented the nucleus of French and especially German military power during the
first half of the 20th century. The ECSC "established the institutional structure of
European integration."7 A decision-making mechanism was desgined, that would
consist of a supranational body comprising "administrative and political"7 functions,
namely the High Authority (which would later become the European Commission);
an intergovernmental body authorized to approve supranational agency, the Council
of Minsters (today the Council); an independent supranational judicial system, the

7

David Armstrong, Lorna Lloyd & John Redmond, eds. International Organisation
in World Politics. Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p. 143
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Court of Justice, to control for compliance with the treaty; and a supranational
democratic assembly, the Common Assembly (now the European parliament), to
supervise and provide for democratic legitimacy.
The Treaty of Rome in 1957 extended this supranational/intergovernmental
decision-making mechanism, the "Communities Method," beyond the coal and steel
industry creating the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European
Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom). The former created a common
market and a customs union among the community’s members, and was supposed to
harmonize social policies. Internal tariff barriers were to be abolished step by step,
and a common external tariff created, free movement of people and capital was
promoted, a common transport policy was adressed, and a European investment bank
was founded. The EAEC was also modelled after the ECSC, and represented a
common approach to the industrialization of nuclear technology.
While the now three communities, namely the ECSC, the EEC, and Euratom had
shared a common Court, and Assembly, they all had their own Commission (High
Authority), and Council. The treaty of Brussels of 1965 integrated all three
communities and replaced the three supranational bodies as much as the three
intergovernmental bodies with one single body respectively.
Yet, the early 60s had been characterized by French scepticism with respect to the
power of supranational agency in the process of European integration.8 It was the
Commission’s authority to initiate community policy, and the Councils conceptual
influence was rather modest, especially once a general course of action was adopted,
since it took unanimity to alter measures taken by the Commission. French President
DeGaulle represents one French official, who can certainly not be described as a
8

Neill Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, Durham: Duke
University Press, 2003, p.558
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supranational entrepreneur. The Fouchet plan, which was not adopted after all,
represented the general’s proposal for a "Europe de Patries", a system of
institutionalized intergovernmental bargaining.
After DeGaulle’s loss of power in 1968, which represented the beginning of a
phase of enlargement of the EEC that would span almost 15 years, and which would
provide great obstacles on the way to the "ever closer union", the supranational agents
of the Commission initiated a process which was supposed to establish the so-called
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Despite sebacks with respect to monetary and
especially economic integration, and after an intermediary, less ambitious project,
namely the European Monetary System (EMS), EMU was revived in 1988 by the
supranational agency of the President of the European Commission at the time,
Jacques Delors, and the Single European Act (SEA). A single currency and a single
market ultimately represented the core of a renewed "deepening" of the Union as
much as of the post-Cold War process of European integration
The Economic and Monetary Union, which today represents the most integrated
feature of the EU, represented an essential issue area of the first pillar of the Three
Pillar System, as established by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. EMU’s most
exclusive supranational feature is the Central European Bank, which was also created
with the Treaty of Maastricht, and is supposed to administer and control for the
stability of the Euro. It was designed to be entirely independent from
intergovernmental as much as other EU supranational bodies in order to watch
member states’ compliance with the so-called "convergence criteria" formulated by
the SGP.
The Three Pillar System organizes all policy areas related to the completion and
administration of the single European market through the "Community Method" of
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decision making. As suggested above, the European commission would make
proposals to the Council, which would vote on these issues by qualified majority vote
(QMV, a procedure of weighted voting replacing unanimity and extended in scope
especially with the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997), and decisions would then be
referred to the examination and assent of the European parliament. Policy initiative
was generally the responsibility of supranational agents, the intergovernmental
Council of member states’ ministers would have the authority to decide, and the
supranational European parliament was consulted in order to demonstrate Democratic
legitimacy.9
The other two pillars comprised foreign and defense policies on the one hand, and
judicial and police matters on the other. Both policy areas were dealt with mostly
intergovernmentally and with respect to foreign and defense policy by unanimous
vote.
While EMU as the central feature of European integration after 1990 is strongly
associated with supranational agency as its initiator, the Treaty of Maastricht,
according to a study of the Centre for European Studies at the University of Oslo10, on
the other hand represented the beginning of a development, that would assert the
position of member states and the role of the intergovernmental council, and further
enhance the position of the supranational European Parliament (EP), which since
1979 had been elected by Europe’s population, vis-a-vis the Commission. The
Council was given the right to initiate EU policy, which had formerly been a
monopoly of the Commission, and the so-called co-decision procedure strengthened

9

Europa: Gateway to the European Union, europa.eu,
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/index_en.htm
10
Hussein Kassim and Anand Menon, European Integration since the 1990s:
Member States and the European Commission, University of Oslo: Centre for
European Studies, 2004
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the legislative influence of the EP in comparison to both, the Council, and the
Commission. While traditionally the Commission had assumed administrative as
much as political relevance, her political influence, meaning her opportunity for
supranational entrepreneurship was increasingly undermined, and her administrative
function was emphasized.
Intergovernmental EU summits and conferences increased in number, and the
process leading to the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 was characterized, by of course
enlargement in Eastern Europe, and further integration of policy on an
intergovernmental basis closely tied to democratic legitimization through the EP, and
national parliaments. The qualified majority voting procedure was continously
extended in scope across policy areas of the Community Pillar as much as the Judicial
Pillar.
The Treaty of Lisbon, which was signed in 2007 and adopted in 2009, after the
original Constitutional Treaty of Rome from 2004 had failed to be ratified by
signatory member states, represents the status quo of the EU’s legal foundation. When
having a close look at the central institutional innovations of the Treaty of Lisbon, its
intergovernmentalist nature becomes apparent. An exit clause was introduced, which
provides member states with the option to withdraw from the Union, the Council has
been given a permanent president (28 months renewable term), and the qualified
majority vote was not only again extended in scope, but thresholds were lowered,
thereby extending the Council’s authority and efficiency, and member states’ sacrifice
of national sovereignty. The traditional weighted voting procedure, which would give
Council members different amounts of votes according to their population size was
replaced by the so-called "double majority" voting procedure, which would require at
least 55% of the Council’s members representing at least 67% of the Union’s
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population in order to adopt a decision. In a case, in which the Council acts without
initiative from the Commission, a majority of at least 72% of the Council’s members
have to agree.11
While the Commission’s competencies were reduced rather than extended, an
additional supranational body was created with respect to a common foreign and
defense policy (CFDP). The European External Action Service (EEAS), led by the
High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is supposed to
promote harmonized approaches among intergovernmentally deciding member states.
So far the success of the supranational entrepreneurship of this young agency is
questionable, especially, as mentioned earlier, when looking at the EU’s dissonant
reaction to the recent events in Libya.
I conclude this section of my study, namely an evolutionary overview of the EU’s
institutional

framework

according

to

neofunctionalist/supranational

and

intergovernmentalist/state-centric elements, with the notion, that this data is crucial in
order to understand the political process leading to the creation of ESM and the "Pact
for the Euro" in March 2011. Yet, since ESM is a feature of EMU in particular, and
since the common currency represents the key to common economic policy as it is
sought in the Pact, I would now like to turn to a brief, but yet decently detailed
account of the history of EMU.
A brief history of EMU
The Euro as we know it today is the result of a initiative of the Commission in the
late 80s, yet this initiative built on a contemporary historical process, that should be
outlined in more detail.

11

Europa: Gateway to the European Union, europa.eu,
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/index_en.htm
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Member states’ interest in monetary integration had already become apparent
during the late 1960s, when the weaknesses of the Dollar, and the Bretton Woods
system became acute. The French franc lost value, while the German mark gained.12
During the Hague summit in 1969 the Council created a committee to propose a
course of action that should lead to monetary and further economic integration. While
the result, the Werner Report, came up with a clear concept for monetary union, the
definition of economic union remained ambigous and the debate on how to
accomplish EMU until 1980 was characterized by two opposing positions. On the one
hand there were the "monetarists", who held that "monetary union should be
implemented immediately"13, and that "fixing of exchange rates...would compel
member states to pursue complementary macroeconomic policies". This position was
promoted by an alliance of the member states of France, Belgium, Luxemburg, and
the Commission. On the other hand there were the "economists", who said, that
macroeconomic balancing would be the first step, since without "fixing exchange
rates was not sustainable". This position was represented by the member states of
Germany and the Netherlands. The EMU system, as proposed by the Werner
committee, aimed to reduce member states’ currency fluctuations and allowed for
limited inner-European financial aid to bolster weaker members through the European
Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF).
However, due to the mentioned incompleteness of, and controversy within EMU on
the one hand, and on the other due to the global monetary crisis caused by the
breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, the establishment of economic and
monetary union by 1980 failed in the early 70s.
12

R.A. Mundell, The European Monetary System 50 years after Bretton Woods: A
Comparison Between Two Systems, Project Europe 1985-95, Siena 1994,
http://www.columbia.edu/~ram15/ABrettwds.htm
13
Armstrong Lloyd and Redmond, 2004, p. 163
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As a consequence of a Franco-German initiative the idea was revived and the
system was replaced in 1978 by a similar, yet less ambitious model, the European
Monetary System (EMS). The EMS incorporated the European Currency Unit (ECU),
a weighted average of the participating currencies, the Exchange Rate Mechanism
(ERM), which would contain bilateral currency fluctuations, and credit facilities, that
would allow for assistance to weaker members through low-interest loans, and were
supposed to prevent speculation.
The EMS was quite successful in providing for currency stability, and when
consensus grew, that European market potential could only be fully exploited, if
monetary integration would finally be accomplished, the SEA in 1988 established a
three-stage-plan, which would create a common currency in Europe by 1999.
To this end, Article 121(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Community
(Maastricht 1991) defined convergence criteria which represented the requirement for
any member to join the common system. Member states were expected to keep annual
fiscal debt below 3% of GDP and reduce gross fiscal debt to 60% of GDP. The
guidelines represented a compromise between, monetarists and economists. The
introduction of a common currency was paralleled by the introduction of a process to
harmonize monetary and economic policy, and was agreed upon on the basis of a "no
bail-out"clause, which would forbid members to support others’ fiscal debt.14
In 1995 the German Minister of Finance at the time Theo Waigel proposed a
"Stability Pact for Europe", calling for automatic sanctioning in the case of a member
state failing to meet convergence criteria from 1999 on. In 1996 the SGP was

14

Jonas Fischer, Lars Jonung and Martin Larch, 101 Proposals to reform the Stability
and Growth Pact. Why so many? A survey, Economic Paper, no 267, Brussels:
European Commission, 2006
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adopted, but again represented a compromise, and the automatism of sanctions was
not as strict as the German government would have liked it to be.15
After a good start of the Euro and the SGP, first problems became apparent, when
the global economy turned down after 9/11, and provoked doubt about the SGP’s
efficiency in difficult times. Germany and Portugal were the first to "breach the 3% of
GDP reference value"16. Both Germany and France failed to meet the criteria in 2004,
and the Commission’s request for "further action" ("while at the same time
postponing the deadline for meeting the 3% limit by one year, to 2005"), which was
tied to the implementation of sanctions in the case of renewed failure to comply, was
ruled out by a blocking minority of France, Germany, Italy and the UK in the
Council.
On March 20, 2005, the Council of European Ministers of Finance adopted a
reform "Improving the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact". This new
pact, while leaving the criteria intact, was designed to on the one hand allow for more
flexibility and on other to improve implementation by strengthening the "preventive
arm" of the SGP, and of the Commission as "Guardians of the Treaty". Debt to GDP
ratios as much as "potential growth and the sustainability of public finances",17 were
to be assessed on a country-to-country basis. The Commission was given the authority
to make recommendations to member states in order to prevent failure to meet criteria
without approval of the Council. However the weak corrective arm of the
Commission was not strengthened, and over all the new Pact represented an
enhancement of the descriptive value rather than the normative value of this piece of
legislation.

15

Armstrong, Lloyd and Redmond, 2004, p.163
Fischer, Jonung and Larch, 2006, p. 9
17
Fischer, Jonung and Larch, 2006, p. 23
16
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Just a few weeks ago, close to 6 years after the adoption of the new Pact, member
states’ came to adopt further alterations as concequence of EMU threatening to fail
over all. On March 15, 2011, the Council on Economic and Financial Affairs agreed
to the strengthening of the corrective arm of the SGP in particular. An early sanction
mechanism would make it possible to demand a deposit of diverging member states’
of 0.2% of GDP already at the time an excessive budget procedure is decided upon by
the Council, and if a recommendation of the Council to correct "the deficit is not
followed", a fine will be automatic. The automatism of the sanctioning mechanism
was slightly enhanced through the "reverse majority rule", which implies the
Commission’s proposal to impose a fine to be binding, unless it is "turned down by
the Council via qualified majority vote." Further budgetary frameworks and
surveillance would be standardized according to EU guidelines.
The agreement also calls for a "broadening" of "the surveillance of the member
states’

economic

policies"18.

Aiming

to

prevent

and

correct

"excessive

macroeconomic imbalances", an "excessive imbalance procedure" was introduced,
which gives the Commission and the Council the authority to impose a "yearly fine
equal to 0.1% of GDP" again via the "reverse majority rule". The excessive imbalance
procedure allows for much more flexibility than the excessive budget procedure, but it
is especially noteworthy, because, virtually for the first time, it adresses the
implementation of economic union directly.
I conclude this section of my study, which provides for a historical account of
EMU, with the notion, that all fines imposed on member states through the new
mechanism would be pooled to assist member states in difficulty. Further, the data on
the institutional framework of EMU and the EU as a whole as oulined above
18
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according to their respective historic evolutions and theoretical foundations, is
necessary to be able to understand the political process leading to the creation of ESM
and "The Pact for the Euro" on March 25, 2011.
Before I get to determine, whether supranational or state-centrist, whether
neofunctionalist or liberal intergovernmentalist theoretic paradigms are best fit to
explain this deflection on the dependent variable, namely European integration, I
would now have to provide a detailed account of the events leading to the creation of
ESM and the related "Pact for the Euro".
Chronology of events leading to the creation of ESM
I will provide a detailed chronological account of the political processes which led
to the creation of the permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM) on March 25,
2011. An examination of the role played by different EU institutions and of the
controversial positions of member states will provide for insights into the fiber of the
decision-making process, and relations of power within EMU and the EU as a whole.
On the 17th of February 2009 the European Commission published a report on the
economic performance of 17 member states. Convergence criteria as established by
the Treaty of Maastricht, which require member states to keep the fiscal budget deficit
under 3% of GDP had already been violated in 2008 by France, Greece, Spain,
Ireland, Latvia and Malta. In the middle of the economic downturn that had been
caused by the global financial crisis in 2008, and had forced European member states
to provide substantial bail out packages to stressed national banks, the economic
health of those countries in particular continued to suffer. The European
Commissioner of Economic and Monetary Affairs at the time, Joaquin Almunia,
stated that EU members were "going through a very serious crisis that is taking its toll
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on public finances"19. Especially Ireland was anticipated to substantially exceed fiscal
budget deficit limits by 6.5 % of GDP (a total of 9.5%), yet Almunia immediately
suggested, that "the Commission will use the full flexibility imbedded (in EU rules),
when considering the next steps under the excessive deficit procedure in the weeks to
come". The convergence criteria of the SGP were primarily established to safe-guard
the stability of the common currency, which had experienced a peak in strength in
2007, 1.6 Dollars per Euro, and had fallen under 1.1 Dollars per Euro in late 2008.
Violations of deficit limits, as mentioned had been occuring regularly in the past,
however the scope of the new developments caused the European Commission to
utter concerns "about the volatility of the exchange rate in EU countries".
After national elections in Greece in October 2009 the incoming government led by
the new prime minister George Papandreou reported an anticipated budget deficit of
12.7% of GDP. The numbers previously published by the former Greek
administration led by Kostas Karamanlis had suggested an expected deficit of only
5%, and grave flaws in the information politics between the EU and the member state
of Greece became apparent. The loss of trust, and of the belief in the ability of Greece
to consolidate her fiscal budget and to service debt, led to the down rating of Greek
state-bonds "by two of the main rating agencies, Fitch and Standard & Poor’s"20.
Despite temporary relaxation of the situation, due to Greece’s successful sale of bonds
in the value of $25 billion, and a new government plan to cut the deficit, EU officials
began considering a rescue package behind the scenes.
When it became apparent in the course of the following months, that the problem
may not be solved easily, European leaders stated general will to support Greece as a
19

Spiegel Online, „EU Concerned as Countries Violate Deficit Rules“,
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,608513,00.html
20
From the print edition, „A very European crisis“, The Economist, February 4, 2010,
http://www.economist.com/node/15452594
24

member of EMU, however the debate on how to accomplish the stabilization of Greek
debt and of the Greek state, was going to be characterized by grave controversy
among EMU members and EU institutions.
Germany in particular displayed great reluctance and hesitation with respect to
quick moves, that were likely to undermine the original framework of EMU, and the
"no-bail-out" clause of the Treaty of Maastricht, which Germany had insisted upon
back in the day. An article in the New York Times from February 15, 2010,
documents the disapproval of the German public with two thirds of the population
voting against a Greek bail out in polls. Slightly above half of German citizens would
further have prefered Greece to be expelled "from the euro group entirely, if its
mountain of debt threatened the stability of the currency union"21. Opposition formed
way beyond public opinion: National economic and financial elites, which represent
the traditional clientel and power base of the Christian Democratic Union, and Angela
Merkel’s administration, became increasingly vocal about the unacceptibility of such
severe violation of EMU law. Up to date the issue of the Euro crisis causes major
friction among economic and political leaders in Germany. It led not only to a most
controversial publication by Hans-Olaf Henkel, a former president of the Association
of German Industry (one of the most powerful lobbying groups in the country),
suggesting Germany to quit EMU, but also to the abandonment of Axel Weber’s
(head of the German federal bank) most promising candidacy for presidency of the
CEB.
German negotiators adapted the idea of an ordered process of insolvency for
Greece as a possible option on the bargaining table in Brussels. According to an
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article in the German magazine the "SPIEGEL" from March 26, 2010, the German
chancellor Angela Merkel had initially tried to entirely keep the Greece issue off the
agenda of the scheduled EU summit on March 26, 2010.22 When the unavoidability of
adressing the topic became apparent, due to quickly dropping exchange rates during
that same week, she laid out three conditions for an agreement on any European aid
plan. First, the German administration demanded a precise defintion of "last resort",
secondly the involvement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the project,
and third the tightening of the SGP. While successfully defending conditions one and
two, against opposition, especially with regards to IMF involvement, from EU
agencies as much as from what the German press came to call the "Club Med"
fraction - a coalition of the Euro member states of France, Spain, Italy, Greece and
Portugal - she failed in obtaining legal agreements on tightening SGP. It was agreed,
that unanimity among the 17 Euro zone states would be required for any money to
flow in the case of an emergency making specific loans necessary. German concerns
about the lack of coercive mechanisms within the EU in order to grant for Greece’s
austerity, which after all were supported by opposing members’ rejection of the legal
"deepening" of the SGP, are likely to have primarily caused Germany to adopt the
position of the IMF to enter the picture. IMF programmes on the one hand provide for
effective compliance control and on the other incorporate tools for the involvement of
the private sector in granting the sustainability of an aid receiving state’s debt.23On
April 11, 2010 the Council agreed to provide loans of up to 30 billion Euro to Greece
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at an interest rate of close to 5 % in order to prevent Greek insolvency as a payment
deadline was approaching on May 9, 2010.24
However, when it became apparent 10 days later in a public statement of the
European Union’s official statistics agency (eurostat) that Greek numbers on the 2009
budget had not been accurate, and that the actual deficit had been at 13.6% rather than
12.7% of GDP, rating agencies again cut ratings for Greek state bonds. The news
represented a shock to markets, and within three days, ratings for Spain and Portugal
were also lowered. In an emergency meeting on May 9th, 2010 the ministers of
finance of the 27 members of the EU agreed in Brussels on a historic bail-out package
for indebted member states, creating the European Financial Stability Facility. "EFSF
is a Luxembourg-registered company owned by Euro Area Member States. It is
headed by Klaus Regling, former Director-General for economic and financial affairs
at the European Commission"25. The EFSF administers two thirds of the rescue
package designed for the bail-out of member states for the sake of the stability of the
common currency as a whole. It was designed as a temporary tool, and was supposed
to stop activity in 2013.
The over all aid system has four structural components: Up to 60 billion Euros are
provided by European Commission loans based on the mechanisms established to
solve non-Eurozone, EU members’ balance-of-payment problems. In addition, if
needed, Eurozone members grant for a volume of 440 billion Euros in total on the
grounds of bilateral guarantees. Further, modelled after the plan for the Greek bail out
the IMF contributed 250 billion Euros, which sums up to a total of 750 billion Euros.
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A bilateral meeting between the heads of the member states of France and Germany
in Deauville, had preceded the EU summit in Brussels on December 17, 2010. The
relationship of the two countries, and their leaders Angela Merkel and Nicholas
Sarlozy, had suffered from great controversy over the events of the year. Many of the
intergovernmental processes had been characterized by the opposing positions of two
coalitions of Eurogroup member states. One was led by France, Italy and Spain, and
the other by Germany, the Netherlands and Finland. The bilateral meeting in France
represented a reconciliation of the decisive axis Paris-Berlin, and although this
exclusive negotiation caused discontent to other member states, the Franco-German
agreement was finally supported in Brussels.
It was agreed, that a "permanent stabilization mechanism" was necessary to
strengthen the Union and the common currency. It was decided to continue to pool
funds among the 16 Eurogroup members, to assist stressed member states beyond the
inital deadline in 2013, and to create the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).
While the details of the structural design of ESM were postponed to the spring
summit in March 2011, the cornerstones were outlined, based on the Franco-German
deal:
"Last Resort" was defined as a case of danger to the stability of the entire Euro
zone, and unanimity in the Council was required in order to activate the fund. Further,
loans would be subject to strict conditionality and the IMF would continue to be
involved on the basis of earlier negotiations. Most importantly, so-called "Collective
Action Clauses" (CACs) were introduced, which involve the private sector in the
assurance of the sustainability of a member states’ debt. More precisely, investors
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would have to agree to a haircut, similar to an ordered procedure of insolvency
modelled after the mechanisms of the IMF, and debt restructuring. 26
Revision of the Treaty of Lisbon would be necessary in order to create the
permanent European Stability Mechanism, however it became clear, that a further
delegation of sovereignty may require referenda in certain member states, and the
negative experience with (for example) Ireland’s ratification of the treaty led
members to design ESM on an intergovernmental basis, which would still require
ratification of national parliaments, but no referenda.
Further, German chancellor Angela Merkel in her press conference on December
17, 2010 in Brussels said, that "during the debate over the macroeconomic situation,
we saw on the one hand, that improved culture of stability is needed, yet on the other
support for growth potential as well"27. This statement suggests, that a further
integration of inner European economic policy is ahead. On the one hand economic
aid funds will be transferred across national borders, and a harmonization of
economic capability within the EU will be adressed. On the other hand a further
harmonization of fiscal policy is desired.
Already in September 2010 the European Commission had put forward a package
of "legislative proposals" concerning ‚EU economic governance". The President of
the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso stated: "For the first time we address
decisively the preventive arm of the Stability and Growth Pact; for the first time we
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propose that sanctions must be implemented much earlier in the process; for the first
time we propose a structured system to deal with macroeconomic imbalances".28
This plan would have given new power to the Commission such as direct influence
on member states’ taxation and fiscal spending policies through "early sanction
mechanisms" applied by the Commission without approval of the Council, which
would only have a say through the so-called "reverse voting mechanism".
However the outcome of the EU summit on March 24 and 25, 2011, did not quite
match the vision of the Commission, although all aspects suggested by the proposal
were discussed.
Institutional outcome
An institutional deepening of the SGP under supranational authority of the
Commission was not achieved. While the automatism of the Commission’s sanction
mechanisms was enhanced, the "reverse majority rule" stands for the Council’s
continous authority. Furthermore a system of intergovernmental "political peer
pressure" was designed in order to adress the harmonization of inner-European
economic and fiscal policy.
This "Pact for the Euro" includes the 17 members of the Euro group plus Bulgaria,
Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. The conclusive document of the
March 2011 Council holds, that the "Pact focusses primarily on areas that fall under
national competence and are key for increasing competitiveness and avoiding harmful
imbalances"29. The United Kingdom, Sweden, Hungary and the Czech Republic are
not part of this agreement. An annual review of best national practices shall lead to
concrete measure taken by member states to enhance competitiveness, the
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sustainability of public finances and the stability of the financial sector. These
commitments would then be implemented and supervised by the Commission. This
method is going to be applied to all of the four areas, eventually including additional
supranational bodies, such as the European Systemic Risk Board (a European institute
for bank control) or the CEB.
The ESM was structured as follows:
It is managed by a Board of Governors, consisting of the EMU member states. The
European Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs, and the President of the
CEB will attend meetings as observers. In addition there will be a Board of Directors,
and the agreement holds, that "voting weights within the Board of Governors and the
Board of Directors will be proportional to the Member States’ respective
subscriptions to the capital of the ESM. A qualified majority is defined as 80 percent
of the votes.”20 Further, the ESM will start to operate in 2013, when the EFSF
mandate expires, and will have 700 billion Euro in funds, 200 billion Euro in addition
to the EFSF’s 500 billion. The CEB determines the contribution of each member to
the fund according to shares in CEB’s capital, population size and GDP.
I conclude this chapter, the "Chronology of events and institutional outcomes" with
a brief description of the rather complex decision making procedure of the
ESM:When assistance is demanded by a Euro zone member state, the Eurogroup
informs the Council and requests the Commission and the CEB to assess the question
of "last resort" and the sustainability of the member states’ debt. The Commission
will then, together with the CEB and the IMF negotiate the conditionality of an aid
programme, which is then to be approved by the Council and then the Board of
Governors. Commission, CEB and IMF will then supervise compliance and report to
the Council and to the Board of Directors. Commission and Council will further
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inform the European Parliament on ESM’s operations. ESM decision-making
procedures involve on the one hand intergovernmental settings within the Euro group
as much as within the broader EU framework, and on the other the supranational
bodies of the Commission, the CEB and the European Parliament. In addition non
Euro-group as much as non-EU states are permitted to get involved if desired, and the
IMF continues to participate in the design and implementation of austerity programs
for receiving states. The intergovernmental body of the Council has the authority to
initiate the process, and to approve specific programmes. The key decision-making
bodies of the ESM are intergovernmental, and supranational bodies rather play an
administrative role.
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CHAPTER 3
Chapter 3 provides for an analysis of data on the political process that led to the
institutional outcome of the creation of ESM and the "Pact for the Euro" by an
agreement of the Council of the European Union on March 25, 2011 in Brussels. As
oulined in the Research Design, according to central pillars of the contrasting theories
neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism, I will seek to find evidence on
supranational agency as determining factor in the process and the institutional
outcome. Secondly I will investigate member states’ interest and the significance of
intergovernmental bargaining in the process and as reflected by the institutional
outcome. The opposing positions of the member states of France and Germany, which
had characterized the process will be of particular interest in this context. A brief
discussion of the concept of national preferences in this context will be added.
Then I will investigate the creation of ESM and the "Pact for the Euro" as an
incremental, endogenous process, as neofunctionalism would suggest on the one
hand, and on the other analyse the impact of external events on the process, as liberal
intergovernmentalism holds.
Supranational Agency
Besides ensuring the stability of the Euro, leveling out macroeconomic imbalances
within the Euro zone had ever since the introduction of the common currency in 1999
been of central concern to the authority of the European Commission. Countries of
such diverse levels of productivity sharing a common currency, as is the case among
the member states of EMU, find themselves running into distributive problems. But
since measures necessary to effectively impact states’ competitiveness, on the one
hand involve policy areas sensible to the very core of state sovereignty, such as
taxation and details of fiscal spending, and on the other would require massive
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redistribution of capital within the Union, the Commission had hardly been able to
circumvent member states’ opposition.
The debate over the Euro crisis, wich ultimately resulted in the creation of ESM,
displayed the fact, that heads of state came to agree with supranational agents on the
necessity of a further integration of economic policies with all its implications for
national politics in order to preserve not only the common currency, but also the over
all project of the Union. The debate on this issue among supranational agents and
member states perpetuated a pattern of the economically more potent states’ (the
North) supporting the Commission’s call for an extension of supranational authority
with respect to member states’ internal fiscal policy, while opposing an extension of
supranational authority to increase and direct community funds. On the other hand,
the economically less potent states, and potential receivers of aid tended to support
more supranational authority with respect to funds, while opposing extension of
supranational authority with respect to national fiscal policy.
The position of the commission was made clear by Joaquin Almunia: "In the euro
area…default does not exist"30.
As mentioned, in September 2010 the Commission, building on concepts
previously developed in the context of the ‚deepenening" of the SGP, had put forward
a first concrete proposal for the creation of a revised and complementary institutional
framework which was supposed to establish a permanent mechanism that would
realize monetary stability and a harmonization of economic capability.This proposal
gave the Commission the authority to formulate common economic policies, and to
trigger the stability mechanism, which consists on the one hand of the implementation
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of early sanctions in order to ensure member states’ compliance to the convergence
criteria, and on the other the direction of pooled member states’ funds. Besides the
mentioned conflict between France and Germany on quick moves bailing out Greece,
and further delegation of sovereignty, the conflict between the German administration
and the Commission had also been a central feature of the process leading to the
creation of ESM.31 According to an article in the German newspaper the
"Handelsblatt", German chancellor Angela Merkel, and President of the European
Commission Jose Manuel Baroso (who was elected in 2004 especially thanks to the
support of Angela Merkel leading the German opposition at the time), who during the
greatly complicated negotiations over the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 had still worked
together, fought a "power struggle" against each other during the entire episode from
Greece to Brussels.
Once it was agreed, that the Euro zone should be preserved as it is, actors fought
over the precise institutional design of a permanent mechanism. The question of
sovereignty was central to the controversy among the supranational agents in the
Commission and German state representatives.
Naturally supranational agents, and the European Commission as the principal
"executive body" of the European Union, understood the arising problems, namely the
potential unsustainability of fiscal debt in particluar EMU member states, as a call to
after all entrust the European Union as supranational institution with the solution for
the sake of the common welfare. Increasingly assertive self-determination of
supranational
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neofunctionalist framework, and it is fair to say, that the Commission during the crisis
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fought to embody the supranational approach to European integration by claiming
more executive power.
Further, in early 2011 the conflict between the Commission and the German
government continued, when the Commission called for an additional strengthening
of the fund, that should be provided to the ESM. The Commission was ultimately
successful with the initiative to raise the pool to 80 billion in paid-in capital and 620
billion Euro in guarantees despite German reluctance to agree. Obviously, there is
evidence on a decisive impact of supranational agency on the integrative process, but
not so much on the precise institutional outcome. The central objectives of ESM and
the "Pact for the Euro" are consistent with the Commission’s definition of necessity to
deepen EMU. Yet, as mentioned, the authority of the Commission with respect to
automatic early sanctioning mechanisms in order to ensure member states’
compliance with the SGP was enhanced, but not entirely delegated by the Council,
which preserves the right to annul the Commission’s policies through the reverse
majority rule. The task to realize macroeconomic balance within the EU was not
assigned to the supranational body of the Commission but to an intergovernmental
setting, which operates via political pressure, rather than binding rule.
The "Pact for The Euro" provides for an extension of the EU’s institutional
influence on member states’ fiscal policy, and ESM for an extension of inter-state
redistribution of capital as much as tightened SGP compliance mechanisms. Although
the Commission’s early position, that Greece should be supported by the other EMU
members, clashed heavily with the intitial position of the decisive member state of
Germany, there has not only been a provision of member states’ funds to Greece, but
also a process has been initiated, that may lead to a further de facto integration of
European economic and fiscal policy, and a harmonization of economic capability
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within the European Union. The fact of the matter is, that despite great controversy
among member states and the Commission, the outcome respresents a step in
integration, which embraces the involvement of supranational bodies in the
conception and implementation of programmes to consolidate indebted member
states’ national budget deficits.
Yet, the institutional role the Commission will play in the new mechanism is rather
of an administrative, than an executive nature. The institutional design of the ESM, as
agreed on by member states during the EU summit in Brussels on March 24 and 25,
2011, clearly entrusts intergovernmental bodies with the ultimate decision-making
authority. The initiative triggering the mechanism comes from the Euro group
members, and while the Commission is entrusted with "assessments" of the
dimension of stressed member states’ problems, the intergovernmental bodies, such as
the Council, the Board of Governors and the Board of Directors have to approve
decisions made by the Commission. The Commission further shares the task to tailor
detailed programmes for ESM supported states with the CEB and the IMF, and is
again required to have proposals approved in the intergovernmental settings.
The intergovernmental "peer pressure" method, that has been created to tackle the
harmonization of EMU members’ economic and fiscal policies in order to prevent
future crises, will still have to prove efficiency, but at the time being supranational
agents have no decision-making authority in this process, and only get involved, when
the ESM has been initiated by EMU members.
Intergovernmental Bargaining
The political, inter-state process, intergovernmental bargaining on the basis of
national preferences, which after all serve to define national interest, clearly
determined the design of the ESM and of the "Pact for the Euro". Sovereignty of
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member states is factually only delegated as a consequence of QMV in
intergovernmental procedures eliminating single members’ right to veto, once a case
of "last resort" is agreed upon.
While specific economic interests were divergent, rather than"convergent", states’
common interest in the preservation of the Euro in its present form made an
agreement on further institutional integration after all possible.
All actors involved eventually came to link the future of EMU to the future of the
European Union itself, and an abandonment of this project was apparently as
unacceptable to the opposing member state of Germany as it had been to the
European Commission and virtually also to the French government.
The following two scenarios were imaginable as an alternative to the preservation
of the Euro as it is. First, there is the withdrawal of insolvent member states from
EMU, a haircut at the cost of private investors, and a devaluation of a new national
currency in order to regain competitiveness. The second option, that has been drawn
up by European economists such as Michel Gedot or Axel Weber, and which
continues to impact the debate on European economic integration, is to split the Euro
zone in half and create a "South Euro" and a "North Euro". Most enthusiastic
proponents of this vision, such as Hans Olaf Henkel32, a former President of the
Association of German Industry and former supporter of the Euro, could even
imagine a model, that would not integrate France and Germany. Although the bulk of
economic analysts continues to question the sustainability of the Euro, and although
weak member states’ need for room to devaluate continues to be heralded in the
business world, political actors refuse to adopt such a course of action at the time
being.
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When the systemic relevance of Greece’s possible default became apparent by the
cut in ratings of Spain’s, and Portugal’s credibility as a consequence to the adjusted
numbers on the Greek budget deficit in early 2010, the consensus on the common
interest among member states, that EMU should be preserved, served as the guide to
the final agreement made in March 2011.
While France had early taken position alongside the European Commission in favor
of supporting Greece, and of preserving the Euro zone as a whole, Germany had
intially considered the option of convincing Greece to quit EMU.
Apparently, in the early stages of this crisis, which would soon expand to the
member states of Spain, Ireland and Portugal, the German administration did not
identify the systemic relevance of Greece’s anticipated bankruptcy. And as soon as it
came apparent, that actors were potentially deciding on the future of the very Union, a
common position was found rather quickly.
The remarkable thing about this particular process is that the dividing line led up
the Rhine river. It is certainly not a novelty to the history of European integration that
France and Germany would start negotiating on the grounds of opposing positions,
but both countries represent the largest contributors to ESM funds providing for more
than 47 per cent of the paid-in capital of 80 billion, and of the 420 billion in
guarantees.
The German Position
The German position stands for a member state, that is unwilling to cease
sovereignty, because it first and foremost has to serve the interest of the national
electorate. While the German government is consistent in its political will to preserve
EMU over all, it is conscious of the fact, that most of the funds being redistributed
come from the national tax revenue. Germany therefore claims direct political impact
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on the decisions made by, and the programmes undertaken by the European
Commission. While this potent member state’s general commitment to the pooling of
sovereignty is apparent, there is little evidence of a willingness to delegate
sovereignty to supranational bodies. German European leaders are obviously statecentric enough to maximize Germany’s independent power and influence on
European international processes.
For Germany to eventually support the position of the Commission and the French
government, and to acknowledge the necessity of inner European redistribution of
capital as one condition for the preservation of EMU, the threat of a fundamental cut
in the relationship with France must have represented the key issue of systemic
relevance.
Across the German political spectrum officials of all ranks, and parliamentarians of
virtually all parties, against audible, critical voices of all kinds of intra-state groups,
publicly stated, that Germany had benefitted greatly from the Euro, and linked the fate
of EMU to the fate of the Union itself. Chancellor Angela Merkel claimed the
creation of ESM to be "without alternative"33. Two-thirds of German exports, which
in total make up 47% of GDP, go to EMU member states - markets that were likely to
get lost if states were devaluating. But, most importantly, German geopolitical weight
had been linked to European integration ever since the Treaty of Rome in 1952, and
the prevention of renewed inner-Continental European competition among states, and
concerns with enhanced political division as a consequence of economic inequality,
had defined raison d’etat of European states and of Germany in particular, since 1945.
For Germany the entire historical process of European integration had been "without
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alternative", and especially with respect to the Treaty of Maastricht representing
European neigbors’ condition for an agreement to German unification.
According to the Spanish daily newspaper El Pais, Nicholas Sarkozy during a
heated discussion with Angela Merkel in Brussels

on May 9th, threatened to

withdraw France from EMU, if Germany would not support inner European financial
aid34.
At a decision point like that, bearing political implications of such magnitude the
decision to give in to the arguments of supranational agents and French officials,
represented the most rational response, even if the French president’s harsh position
was more an act of Hungarian temperament rather than solid negotiation. In any case,
it worked.
However German negotiators upheld national interest by ensuring direct impact on
the activities of the new mechanism thereby calling for a continuation of the basic
conflict in the future, when the new procedure is tested. The German government has
controlled the initiation of a process, which will harmonize fiscal policy within
Europe according to best practices in an intergovernmental setting. Being the
economically most capable European member state, the "peer pressure" method,
which profits from the essentiality of the over all conflict at hand, namely the end of
EMU and potentially the EU, will enhance especially Germany’s influence on other
member states’ fiscal policy. Wolfgang Schaeuble, the German minister of finance
said, that as any crisis also the Euro crisis "bears an opportunity"35, and although
European integration appears to be taking an initially undesired leap, the German
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government seeks to control the future of this process, which per se is interpreted as
being unavoidable and ultimately in German interest.
The French Position
France’s interest in preserving the Euro as it is, is just as vital as Germany’s interest
in doing so. France’s engagement in European integration, besides shared concerns
about a perpetuation of inner-Continental European conflict after 1945, had
historically been characterized by a desire to check potential German independent
power.36 The Deutsche Mark, in particluar was viewed as a "dictate"37 (Theo Waigel)
during the 80s, and the common currency represented a means to keep German
economic and social policy linked to French economic and social policy.
Further, "In the case of France and Germany, one plus one is three", this statement
by Nicholas Sarkozy during a Franco-German summit in Paris in 2008, gives a hint
with respect to both nations’ "functional interdependence" as much as "convergent
interest" – both seek to maximize geopolitical weight.
However, the intitial controversy among France and Germany points to the fact,
that France’s decision to push alongside the Commission for a Greek bail out despite
the likelihood of a lack of popularity among national voters, had been motivated by
immediately pressing national interests.
France is the only European country that comprises within her national territory the
vast economic imbalances, which set Southern European members apart from
Northern European members. French investment in Greece is the most substantial
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compared to other European states, and her involvement in the Mediterranean region
in general is crucial to French state power. Exposure of French banks to Greece is
nearly 79 billion Euro (German banks have 43 billion Euro exposure to Greece)38, and
according to Dirk Hoffmann-Becking of Sanford C. Bernstein as quoted by the Wall
Street Journal "French banks would be dealt a ‚severe’ blow by a default on Greece’s
debt"39, which potentially would have represented an existential threat to major
institutes such as BNP Paribas or Societe General. The potential gravity of the
consequences of a Greek default to the state of France possibly led French officials to
identify the systemic relevance of Greece’s debt crisis before the Germans did.
National Preferences
A repetitive theme of the press coverage on the issue is a perception of a rather new
German assertion and confidence. After the seminal events during 2008, which after
all served to fundamentally change the global economy, elites grew increasingly
confident of the German system, the social market economy, which relies on liberal
market rules, and yet provides for strong state regulation and a state-run cushion of
social welfare. Further, the German historic trauma with inflation has determined the
country’s strict culture of economic stability, which had been the basis of the SGP.
The consolidation of the fiscal budget, putting a stop to fiscal debt had been on the
German agenda since 2005, and was amended to the basic law in 2009.Germany has
great savings rates, and an enormous trade balance surplus. The myth of the "Swabian
housewive", who saves and only spends money that she has got in her pocket was
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promoted by officials across the aisle. 40The experience with politically intricate, strict
budget reduction policies during the former years on the one hand, and Germany’s
relative success in handling the crisis by promoting national joint efforts among
employers, workers and government agencies using measures such as "Kurzarbeit" on
the other, led to a decrease in political will to tolerate the inner European differences
in fiscal spending policy, especially of virtually less competitive member states. The
lessons learned from the financial crisis with respect to deregulation and fiscal budget
deficits seemed to support the German position, and the reduction of fiscal deficit as
much as the enhanced regulation of the banking sector in particular are now on the
agenda of virtually all developed countries.
Differences in fiscal and economic culture serve to determine national preferences.
There is evidence that these differences were also at the core of the Franco-German
conflict over the future of EMU, and the scope of ESM.
Michel Godet, an economic advisor to the French government, who basically
shared the initial German position, "that some countries should leave the Euro zone",
and who could even envision "two Euro zones", held that "France has the same
Mediterranean mindset as Greece and, like Greece, finances its growth through deficit
spending".41
The following episode on France’s proposition to deepen economic integration
within the EU, during her presidency of the Council in the second half of 2008, will
serve to further highlight the contrasting national preferences among France and
Germany with respect to economic and fiscal policy.
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France had called for a common "European economic government" already in
2008. Nicholas Sarkozy said to the European parliament on October 21, 2008, that
"Europe has a common currency and a central bank, but no common policy", and that
"Europe cannot continue without an economic government"42. About a month after
the break down of Lehman Brothers in New York the French president called in
Brussels for coordinated action of national state funds to buy up weakened European
key industrial enterprises in anticipation of non-EU investors’ potential take overs.
Pointing to state funds in Asia and the Middle East, Sarkozy, said: "I do not want
European citizens to wake up in a couple of month to the fact, that European
companies are owned by non-European capitals."43
However this call for more integration in 2008 was not heard by the German
administration. German divergent economic interest became apparent in the
statements of Germany’s minister of economy at the time, Michael Glos, who said
that "the French proposition to safe-guard European industries against foreign take
over with state money, contradicts all the successful principles of our economic
policy".44
Making this proposition, Sarkozy had particularly the European auto industry in
mind and was demanding a European solution, while Germany preferred to bolster the
auto industry through national programmes such as the German version of "cash for
clunkers".

42

Thomas Gack, Corinna Visser, „Wir brauchen eine Wirtschaftsregierung“, Der
Tagesspiegel Online, October 21, 2008, http://www.tagesspiegel.de/wirtschaft/wirbrauchen-eine-wirtschaftsregierung/1353134.html
43
44

Thomas Gack, Corinna Visser
Thomas Gack, Corinna Visser
45

Apparently, for the German administration to understand and ultimately support a
further integration of European economies, it took the existentiality of the threat of
the Euro crisis expressed by a potential, fundamental break with France.
The "Pact for the Euro" after all represents a first real step towards a potentially
truly integrated economic and fiscal policy in Europe, and Germany as the most
competitive economy within the EU, and greatest potential contributor to CEB and
ESM funding seeks to control the process.
The intergovernmental design of the "Pact for the Euro" and the "peer pressure"
method is likely to provide for a continuation of inner-European conflict, especially
among its key members France and Germany, since the integration of European
economies still has to be realized, and a common economic and fiscal policy still has
to be formulated in detail.
Incremental Endogenous Process
The steps leading to the creation of ESM, at first site, can certainly not be described
as incremental, as neofunctionalism would suggest. Strategies to enhance the stability
of the common currency, EU competitiveness, and to harmonize economic capability
within EMU, as mentioned, have been on the agenda for over 10 years, however this
particular and first meaningful step to accomplish that goal was made rather bluntly,
and spontaneously.
Yet, the creation of the "Pact for the Euro" actually represents the beginning of an
institutional process, which is supposed to eventually lead to an integrated economic
and fiscal policy within the EU, and which therefore could be described as probably
being of an incremental nature. But since we have no other choice than looking at the
present institutional outcome, and since the creation of EFSF, ESM and the related
"Pact for the Euro" represent the deflection on the dependent variable that can be
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observed, we have to acknowledge the relative haste in which these institutions were
created and should postpone the question as to whether the de facto integration of
European economic and fiscal policy may over all turn out to be indeed an
incremental process.
Neofunctionalists, as pointed out, identify spillovers as a key automatism, that,
once sparked by supranational agents causes states to continously delegate
sovereignty in order to reduce transaction costs. Spillover is understood as a positive,
organic process with a life of his own, somewhat independent from state interest per
se, and capable of naturally and incrementally shifting authority from national
governments to supranational institutions.
The institutional outcome of the process leading to the creation of the ESM can
hardly be explained as the result of a spillover. This fact becomes especially evident
with the acknowledgement of the notion, that transnational socio-economic synergies
regarding this issue were virtually absent. While Euroscepticism of national
electorates represents a constant feature of the process of European integration, and of
EMU in particular, interests of relevant economic elites, which had originally
promoted the common currency in opposition to mainstream public opinion across
borders, changed position on EMU. Especially in Germany, the same economic elites,
that intially were decisively involved in the transnational socio-economic activities
leading to the creation of the Euro, came to change their minds, and began to promote
solutions in favor of more national sovereignty. In addition, the heated debate on the
issue makes it hard to identify an organic automatism, and the very limited delegation
of sovereignty in the institutional outcome, which does not include de facto delegation
of sovereignty to supranational bodies, underscores this point.
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The more complicated and yet potentially more enlightening question with respect
to the predictive value of neofunctionalism is the following: To what extent does the
process leading to the creation of ESM, and this further step in the deepening of
European economic integration, represent an endogenous process?
It is observable, that during the year 2010 endogenous sytemic problems were
brought to light. Bank bail-outs, and recovery plans had caused virtually all member
states to increase national debt, and those overindebted in the first place were crushed
by the bursting bubble.
As mentioned, states of vastly differing productivity that share a common currency
encounter distributive problems. Re-distribution of capital across national borders is a
given necessity in such a monetary union, and by itself a most complicated matter for
national politicians. Secondly, less productive European states had little incentive to
implement politically costly, but efficient fiscal policy, since they were after all
profitting from the strength of more competitive member states.
It is indeed a structural problem of EMU’s design, that states of differing economic
capability share a common currency without any mechanism in place to provide for
an equivalent integration of core features of economic and fiscal policy. Due to the
continous fragmentalisation of the political system, which is determined by sovereign
member states’ internal political processes, policies necessary to level out economic
imbalances for the sake of monetary stability of EMU as a whole are most difficult to
implement.
I repeat my point, that the step to create a mechanism that would allow for the redistribution of capital within EMU on the one hand, and on the other the
harmonization of European economic and fiscal policy maximizing member states’
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competitiveness, bears a certain endogenous logic, and to a great degree is a
consequence of institutional insufficiencies immanent to the European system.
Greece’s structural problems, and unsatisfactory economic performance had been
of great significance in the debates accompanying Greece’s entry into EMU in 2001.
Greece was viewed as a potential risk to the stability of the Euro zone from the outset,
however political considerations led member states’ to agree unanimously on the
acceptance of Greece. The inaccuracy of Greece’s numbers had been suspected all
along, and her fiscal spending outgrowing productivity could have been predicted.
Therefore, one could support the neofunctionalist perception of integration
representing mostly an endogenous process, and note, that the creation of ESM had
been anticipated by the incompleteness of the monetary union.
The evidence on the creation of ESM supports this analysis: As soon as the Greek
crisis had become a European crisis, all state governments, and France and Germany
as the most potent ones in particular, did exclude the abandonment of the Euro in its
present form. They rather sought (even painful) compromise in order to preserve the
current state of affairs and to push the process forward towards greater
integration.Undoubtedly the Euro crisis and the creation of the new institution of the
ESM have greatly been determined by endogenous systemic features.
External Shocks And Events
Liberal intergovernmentalist thought criticizes neofunctionalists’ lack of sensitivity
with respect to external factors pushing integration.
The steps taken in 2010, and ultimately the decision made in March 2011 to install
a permanent, comprehensive mechanism to harmonize inner-European economic
capability, would not have taken place without exogenous factors, or better external
shocks and events demanding reactive decision.
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The rhetoric of supranational agents as much as heads of state does indeed imply a
reaction to exogenous factors:
The new Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs Olli Rehn has
celebrated the creation of ESM, by saying that Europe is doing "whatever it takes to
defend the Euro"45, and French president Nicholas Sarkozy held, that Europe was not
going to "let undo others what generations have created"31. The head of BAFIN,
Jochen Sanio had said, that there was a "war of aggression against the Euro
zone"46presumably orchestrated by speculators in banks, hedge and pension funds
around the world. Without getting into this conspiracy theory, I can provide
supportive evidence for external events being key to the initiation of this new step in
European integration: As mentioned, the creation of a permanent stability mechanism
was not discussed before the systemic necessity became clear in the revised rating of
Spain and Portugal by the major rating agencies in New York and London.
However, as outlined above, the French government’s call for the deepening of
European economic and fiscal integration, for a European "economic government" in
2008, had also represented a reaction to the consequences of the global economic and
financial crisis, and was motivated by concerns about non-EU countries gaining
control of weakened EU key industries. This French initiative failed due to especially
German opposition. The German government obviously did not identify the necessity
to integrate further as a reaction to the developments in the global economy after
Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, and preferred to provide national solutions.
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This implies, that Germany did not see any reason to doubt the functionality of the
present institutional framework of the EU as a reaction to international economic
strife in 2008. That observation leads me to argue, that the suggested activity of
external actors, of speculators betting against the Euro, shed light on existentially
problematic issues immanent to the European system, and that this time exogenous
factors may have facilitated the initiation of a probably incremental, endogenous
process, which was essentially unavoidable within the logic of European integration.
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CHAPTER 4
Conclusion
Introducing the conclusive chapter of my study, which aims to determine the
predictive as much as the explanatory value of neofunctionalism and/or
intergovernmentalism, of supranationalism and/or state-centrism as theoretic
approaches to the creation of ESM and the "Pact for the Euro", I would have to note,
that on the one hand there is process, and on the other institutional outcome. Data on
both of these somewhat separated objects is needed to understand and explain
European integration. Integration per se is a mobile phenomenon, and the institutional
outcome represents the status of the process.
A theory’s explanatory value becomes especially evident in the context of the
outcome, yet its predictive value appears rather with respect to the process. State
integration as an outcome is indicated by the actual level of delegation or of pooling
of national sovereignty (or better sacrifice thereof) at a certain point in time. State
integration as a process suggests a historical evaluation and classification of a
particular outcome in order to then be able to speculate about the future process
according to observed developments with respect to the delegation or pooling of
sovereignty in the past.
Most reliable predictions about future process are possible, when the past process
provides for linearity. The more non-linear the process the more complex and
potentially uncertain the prediction.When a process prooves to be perfectly linear,
prediction becomes explanation, since outcomes can be calculated precisely, rather
than speculated upon. Explanatory theory therefore must provide for solidly linear
logic in order to be valuable, and must deliver on the prediction of the precise
outcome.
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Process is measured by the observation of trend, and the mere existence of a
positive trend confirming expectations represents the ultimate supportive evidence on
the dependent variable, in this case state integration.
State integration as a process is normative, state integration as an outcome is
descriptive, and in my view a fundamental misunderstanding among Haas and
Moravcsik appears to be, that Haas is primarily refering to the normativity of the
process, while Moravcsik is mainly concerned with the descriptiveness of the
outcome.
European treaty work captures the descriptive as much as normative quality of
European integration. Law in general, and international law in particular must provide
for a harmonious balance among the two in order to be effective. Supranationalism
embodies the normative element of the EU’s institutional framework, while statecentrism represents the descriptive element.47
Moravcsik’s theory holds that integration as an outcome represents the result of an
occasional sequence, that starts with an intitiative of states following their respective
interests, and which results in a delegation of sovereignty to supranational institutions
as an affirmation of the credibility of commitments made after a process of
intergovernmental bargaining on the basis of relative bargaining power. This precise
linearity represents the explanatory mechanism of liberal intergovernmentalism.
According to this model integration is the supranational outcome of an
intergovernmental process. Supranational institutions serve as the measurement of
integration, but are not part of the process, they rather represent the final outcome.
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I would like to introduce the test of liberal intergovernmentalism with this quite
substantial, and central quote of Moravcsik’s original text:
"European integration resulted from a series of rational choices made by national
leaders who consistently pursued economic interests – primarily commercial interests
of powerful economic producers and secondarily the macroeconomic preferences of
ruling governmental coalitions – that evolved slowly in response to structural
incentives in the global economy. When such interests converged integration
advanced."48
Since liberal intergovernmentalism provides for such a precise linearity, and such a
precise definition of outcome, its value in the context of the creation of ESM and the
related "Pact for the Euro" should be tested according to the nature and origin of the
initiative, the exclusive intergovernmentalism of the process, and delegation of
sovereignty as the integrative outcome.
First, the initiative to pool member states’ funds and to bail out Greece in the first
place had been taken by the European Commission at a point when Germany and
France were still making up their minds about the issue.
The following political process leading to the creation of ESM shows, that interests
among member states regarding this issue were divergent rather than convergent. The
decision to after all engage in a comprehensive process aiming to establish a de facto
EMU was not characterized by convergent, issue-specific national preferences, and
was also not followed by a de facto delegation of sovereignty to supranational bodies,
but rather by a late, but apparently credible commitment of member states to pool and
also delegate sovereignty in intergovernmental settings.
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Furthermore, although external factors had a decisive impact on the recent
developments within EMU and the EU, evidence does not support the notion, that
national preferences were "developed as a consequence of exogenous changes in the
nature of issue-specific functional interdependence."
The national preferences, which had characterized the process of intergovernmental
bargaining, were not really a result of current exogenous changes. The political
process leading to the creation of ESM and the "Pact for the Euro" as much as the
institutional outcome reflect a traditional debate among monetarists and economists,
which has been affiliated with the creation of EMU ever since the early stages of the
process in the late 60s. Both French officials and Commissioners traditionally
represent the monetarist camp, while Germany in alliance with neighboring Northern
European states traditionally embodies the economist position. Just like during the
late 1980s the monetarist alliance, which combines supranational and partial member
state interest, was successful in promoting the immediate pursuit of further monetary
integration without previous macroeconomic balancing. Yet the opposed economist
camp, which in the case of Europe is obviously exclusive to member state interest was
comparatively successful in promoting the integration of European economic and
fiscal policy. Back in 1996 the introduction of the common currency (1999) was
coupled with a mechanism that was supposed to provide for the convergence of
national economic and fiscal policy, namely the SGP. The harmonization of economic
and fiscal policy within EMU as an institutionalized function parallel to the creation
of a common currency represented the compromise between monetarists and
economists back in the 90s, and in fact this parallelity represents the compromise
today. While ESM provides for a redistribution of funds of an unprecedented
dimension across national borders for the sake of monetary stability, SGP sanctioning
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mechanisms have been made more automatic as a responsibility of the Commission to
initiate measures early in the process, and in addition member states have made a
commitment to realize the harmonization of European economic and fiscal policy on
the basis of intergovernmental bargaining.
Liberal intergovernmentalism with respect to the creation of ESM, however
captures correctly the fact, that institutional outcome reflects member states’ national
preferences. The problem is that integration occurred despite the virtual absence of
convergent economic interests, and although de facto delegation of sovereignty to
supranational institutions is minor. The authority to initiate the ESM lies with member
states. Even the only additional delegation of sovereignty to the Commission, namely
the right to initiate binding early sanctions, is after all subject to the Council’s good
will due to the "reverse majority mechanism".
The assertion of member states vis-a-vis the Commission is a phenomenon, that
had characterized the post-Cold War process of deepening as much as widening and is
reflected in the status of the institutional foundation of European integration, namely
the Treaty of Lisbon. In the institutional outcome member states virtually sought to
limit the delegation, or better sacrifices of national sovereignty by strengthening
intergovernmental, rather than supranational elements. QMV procedures provide for
intergovernmental efficiency and supranational institutions have become the less
attractive alternative in order to reach an integrated outcome.
The delegation of sovereignty to supranational bodies has been minor, be it because
supranational agents failed to sufficiently undermine national sovereignty, as
neofunctionalism would assume, or because member states’ commitment lacks
credibility, as liberal intergovernmentalism suggests. Yet, a deflection on the
dependent variable is observable, since member states’ funds are continously being

56

pooled, and member states have accepted factual and potential additional sacrifices of
national autonomy in crucial policy areas.
Germany’s reluctance to follow the Commission’s recommendations, and France’s
all-out threat to quit EMU, first and foremost show, besides the divergence of national
preferences, that functional interdependence was not issue-specific. The German
decision to agree to the creation of ESM did not at all reflect the commercial interests
of the German economic elite, which publicly promoted issue-specific functional
independence suggesting alternative courses of action such as a division of the Euro
zone. Yet, integration occurred and the institutional outcome reflects to a certain
degree German as much as French macroeconomic preference.
I would like to argue, that the fact, that European states chose to continue to
integrate rather than to disintegrate the monetary union was caused by general,
geopolitical interdependence49, rather than issue-specific economic convergent
interest.
While this notion supports state-centrism as being the main determinator of the
process as much as the outcome, it however reveals the weakness of liberal
intergovernmentalist explanatory capacity. The linear precision of Moravcsik’s model
fails to capture the exact process as much as the precise institutional outcome. A
theory, that fails to explain precise institutional outcome, may not necessarily fail to
predict on process. Yet since Moravcsik emphasizes linear precision as the particular
value of liberal intergovernmentalism and integration as an outcome rather than a
process, one has to note, that with respect to explaining the creation of ESM and the
"Pact for the Euro", the theory fails to live up to its promise, and leaves the student of
European integration with a continous need for explanatory theory.
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Moravcsik notes with a certain cynicism, that every time European integration
experiences a step in the process analysts hail neofunctionalism as being the superior
theory despite explanatory insufficiencies. However, any piece of evidence, which
supports the mere existence of a continous process of European integration despite
controversy among member states, does indeed support the neofunctionalist
assumptions of state integration being irreversible and some sort of an incremental
automatic process beyond particular states’ national interest per se.
However

neofunctionalist

explanatory

mechanisms,

just

like

liberal

intergovernmentalist explanatory mechanisms fail to precisely account for the
creation of ESM.
Neofunctionalism understands state integration as being much less of a linear
process,

than

liberal

intergovernmentalism

does,

and

further

understands

supranational institutions as being an essential part of the process not only the
outcome. Transnational socio-economic synergies, which, guided by supranational
agency, serve to incrementally undermine national sovereignty via spillover make
much more of a punctual/circular process, a spiral. Indeed the spiral lacks precision,
and therefore explanatory value with respect to the institutional outcome is not only
more complicated, but limited.
However if observable outcomes serve to confirm a perpetuation of the spiral
nature of the process, the theory continues to hold certain predictive value.
Supranational agency did indeed represent a decisive determinator of the process,
even though the institutional outcome, does not provide for evidence for a substantial
increase in supranational authority.
Moravcsik continously criticizes supranational schools of thought on the grounds
of a rejection of the perception, that supranational institutions are part of the process.
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He states, that "controlled tests reveal that supranational intervention, far from being a
necessary condition for efficient interstate negotiation in the EC, is generally late,
redundant, futile and sometimes even counterproductive."50
However the findings of my research on the process of the creation of ESM and the
"Pact for the Euro" suggest, that Moravcsik is wrong.
With respect to supranational institutions as part of state integration as a process in
the case of the ESM, I realize, that especially in this case where controversy among
states is as serious as it prooved to be, supranational agency is relevant, even if
delegation of sovereignty to supranational bodies in the institutional outcome is
minor. One can only speculate what the outcome of this process would have been, if
the Commission was in the economist camp and would have supported the German,
rather than the French position.
Most likely Greece would have left the EMU, and such a substantial pooling of
funds would probably not have taken place. Presumably, there would not have been
the political momentum to enhance the automatism of early sanctioning mechanisms
of the SGP and to pursue the further integration of European economic policy, which
after all has been a centerpiece of the Commission’s agenda ever since the creation of
EMU as we know it today.
The Commission, at this point in time may not have acquired complete authority
with respect to the realization of the ever closer economic and monetary union, but
her political mission to initiate the process has been achieved, and her conceptual
contributions have been and are contiously appreciated.
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Although the precise institutional design of ESM does not display considerable
delegation of sovereignty to supranational bodies, supranational agency has been a
decisive factor in a process leading to the further pooling of sovereignty, and has
successfully undermined independent national sovereignty.
I have to note, that with respect to the institutional outcome of the political process,
that led to the creation of ESM in March 2011, the explanatory value of
neofunctionalism as much as the explanatory value of intergovernmentalism are only
modest at best. A pooling of funds and potential and factual sacrifices of national
sovereignty have taken place, and supranational agency has been a decisive factor in
this process just like intergovernmental bargaining. The agreement on the creation of
ESM and the "Pact for the Euro" under the authority of intergovernmental bodies
stands for the credibility of member states’ commitment to engage in a contious
process of intergovernmental bargaining, which is supposed to lead to an integration
of European economic and fiscal policy without further delegation of sovereignty to
supranational bodies.
In support of neofunctionalism, there is evidence, that this progress in European
integration can partly be explained as an endogenous process. Member states’
acknowledged, that decisions were needed in order to grant for the preservation of
EMU and potentially the EU as a whole, and the fundamental systemic problem, as
represented by the debate between monetarists and economists suggests the
endogeneity of this deepening of European integration despite diametrical national
preferences.
In support of liberal intergovernmentalism, on the other hand, it is however just as
accurate to claim, that the agreement on a precise institutional outcome at this very
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point in time would not have taken place without the pressing impact of external
events.
A neofunctionalist automatism based on transnational socio-economic synergies
(spillover) was absent as much as indicators of states’ recognition of issue-specific
functional interdependence, as liberal intergovernmentalism would suggest. Rather
member states’ general geopolitical interdependence appears to provide for the
common (rather than convergent) interest in preserving EMU and the EU as a whole
which ultimately led to the institutional outcome. On the other hand divergent issuespecific interests with respect to how to accomplish that goal determine the precise
institutional design.
Neofunctionalist predictive capacity, which relies on the notion, that assertive
supranational agency is the initiator of an incremental process leading states to
sacrifice national sovereignty, retains a certain value. If the creation of ESM and the
"Pact for the Euro" is understood as a step on the long route to integrated economic
and fiscal policy, which I think it should be, then neofunctionalism is correct in
assuming the relevance of supranational institutions in the normative process of
European integration. Further, the fact, that member states’ final agreement was made
under the existential pressure of the potential disintegration of EMU and the EU as a
whole, not only supports the irreversibility and endogeneity of the process, but also
the notion, that integration happens as a consequence of undesired effects of previous
decisions.
Liberal intergovernmentalism on the other hand does provide for a certain
explanatory value, but however fails to measure the dependent variable, since its
focus on the institutional outcome limits its predictive capacity. While
intergovernmental bargaining on the basis of relative bargaining power did indeed
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determine the process, the final commitment despite being evidently credible did not
lead to an institutional design that would entrust the Commission with substantially
increased authority. The prediction, that national preferences would be reflectd in the
institutional outcome holds true, yet according to the precise standards of liberal
intergovernmentalist analysis the creation of ESM and the Euro does not represent a
step in European integration. The creation of the SGP per se, back in 1996, does
precisely fit liberal intergovernmentalist assumptions, since its implementation had
been assigned to the Commission after the agreement of bargaining member states.
The ESM and the "Pact for the Euro" have been established to realize the integration
of European economic and fiscal policy, just like the SGP, and although this new
piece of legislation predominantly relies on intergovernmental settings as the
institutional outcome, the process towards European integration has been advanced in
the context of the SGP.
Max Pollack in a somewhat outdated, but however insightful article analysing the
varying institutional settings and decision-making procedures across policy areas
within the EU’s supranational and intergovernmental framework, notes, that "the
argument presented above neither accepts nor rejects the conflicting claims of
neofunctionalist or intergovernmentalist theories;"51 and I would like to add that my
argument as presented above does neither.
In this context Pollack cites Lowi on pluralist and elitist theories:"One way to deal
with the extraordinary degree of inconsistency among the prevailing schools of
thought is to abandon all (of them)...Another way is to embrace them all and then try

51

Mark A. Pollack, Creeping Competence: The Expanding Agenda of the European
Community, Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 14, no 2, Cambridge University Press,
1994, p. 132
62

to find the limits of applicability of each...In short, once each puts an end to its claim
to universality...it approaches the standards of scientific theory."44
I would therefore like to first identify the central common feature of both, which is
the acknowledgement of the systemic relevance of socio-economic synergies across
borders, and secondly condense the two theories to two central diametrical concepts
of state integration: Supranationalism, and state-centrism. Further, I emphasize the
distinction between integration as a process and integration as an outcome demanding
evidence on the initiation and nature of the process on the one hand, and on the
precise institutional design of a particular piece of legislation (such as the ESM) on
the other.In any case explaining and predicting European integration will remain a
puzzle, if not a riddle. My research on the process leading to the creation of ESM and
the "Pact for the Euro" leads me to conclude, that the normativity of supranationalism
was relevant to the process, but that the institutional outcome perpetuates the trend of
an assertion of state-centrism with respect to future process.
The Future
The recent crisis had brought the European project of the common currency to a
pivotal moment in its history, and if the integration of economic and fiscal policy fails
in the established intergovernmental setting of the "Pact for the Euro", the future of
EMU and the EU as a whole is indeed open.
In an article in the May/June 2011 edition of Foreign Affairs, which was apparently
written before the creation of ESM and which focusses on the EFSF, authors Henry
Farrell and John Quiggin state, that the rigid strategy to cut deficit spending in
European states as a means to stability would not only bear grave economic, but most
importantly grave political consequences. "Dogmatically anti-inflationary" monetary
policy, as represented by the CEB and as demanded by the union’s greatest net
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contributor, Germany, would potentially lead to high unemployment, "more economic
hardship", and ultimately "xenophobia"52. And indeed public opinion during the hot
phase of the crisis in 2010 was characterized by resentiments in receiving as much as
contributing states.
The political task at hand is undoubtedly challenging, and the Euro crisis forces
states to act. This time bomb had been ticking for a while, and the explosion leaves
the developed and comparatively wealthy states in Europe with the responsibility to
after all provide for a meaningful political definition of European Union. Political
processes in democratic states tend to be messy, however these fights have to be
fought. Farrell and Quiggin predict, that if European integration continues to be
associated with increasing economic hardship, then the project may fail politically
due to intensified Euroscepticism among populations. It is in fact already observable,
that in many of the European states, especially on the contributing side, such as
France, the Netherlands, Finland or Austria, ultra-right wing parties, which
traditionally campaign on Euroscepticism, have assumed parliamentary relevance and
even enter governments in coalitions. On the other hand governments of receiving
states continue to fail to implement austerity programmes, simply because they lose
power, like in Portugal or Ireland.
Admittedly the situation is grim, and the future is uncertain. However Europe is not
the only place, where the future is uncertain, and the political question is not only,
whether the EMU member states will be able to compromise and provide for
economic and monetary stability or if the EU will continue to exist, but also whether
there is any politically feasible alternative.There are hardly any Western politicians or
government officials left, who would not agree, that the welfare of a state is not
52
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sustainable without sustainable fiscal spending.I suggest, that developed countries in
the past have neglected the fact, that changes in the political and economic structure
of the world have had a negative impact on the functionality and sustainability of
democratic systems.
Not only the governments of Euro zone states such as Germany, France, Spain,
Portugal, Greece or Italy, but also the United Kingdom and the United States have
identified consolidated fiscal budgets as being without alternative.
The internal political processes, that naturally come along with austerity
programmes are a given democratic reality, and democracies should do, what they
were designed to do, namely to facilitate a societal compromise, that ensures the
stability of the system. It would not have made a difference to Greece with respect to
economic hardship and internal political strife, if they would have left EMU and
resorted to a restructuring of their debt (which they may in fact do soon) without a
European mechanism in place – the internal political situation would have been
comparable, probably even worse.
I argue, that fiscal debt does not only represent a challenge to European integration,
it in fact represents an enormous challenge to the democratic state per se. I claim, that
transnational socio-economic dynamics, global economic interests, have served to
undermine the functionality of virtually all democratic states, and ultra-right wing
groups, nationalism and isolationism have been on the rise in the US as much as in
Europe since the events of 2008.
Beyond European integration theorists have identified a structural problem caused
by the internationalization of the market economy. I quote the American scholar
Robert Gilpin: "Whereas the science of economics emphasizes the efficient allocation
of scarce resources and the absolute gains enjoyed by everyone from economic
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activities, state-centric scholars ... emphasize the distributive consequences of
economic activities...."53 Robert Gilpin further identifies a "clash between the
evolving economic and technical interdependence of national societies and the
continuing compartmentalization of the world political system into sovereign
independent states,"which in his view leads to an "inevitable clash between the logic
of the market and the logic of the state."54
The Global market economy will stay with us for a while to come, simply because
the world’s most powerful nations share an interest in upholding it. Democratic states’
only option to solve the political problem arising with the clash between the logic of
the transnational market, and the logic of the sovereign nation state, is to integrate.
The history of the European common currency is closely tied to the history of
globalization, and European economic and monetary integration is now more than
ever a political rather than an economic mission. The recent decision to save the Euro,
which implicitly represents a decision to save the EU, was motivated politically rather
than economically, and it is fully consistent with a state-centric approach to
integration. As long as global economic competition continues to determine
individual states’ dependence and independence, European states will integrate as
deeply as they must in order to preserve the democratic state system, while upholding
open markets.
The process of European integration has not come to an end, despite countless
moments of great turbulence, and internal strife. The year 2010 probably represented
the most serious challenge to the European Union and the process of European
integration since 1990, if not ever since its very beginning in the 1950s.The current
institutional status of the highly turbulent process of economic and monetary
53
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integration, namely the ESM and the "Pact for the Euro", will have to prove its utility,
efficiency and legitimacy, but however stands for an expression of European states’
strong political commitment to face the future together, rather than to allow economic
inequality and consequential political division to cause a potential repetition of
history, and to limit the continents potential.
Further, given the fact, that since 1992 member states have asserted their
institutional position vis-a-vis the European Commission, which itself is increasingly
losing room for political function, I claim, that the more European states come to
understand their general functional interdependence as neighboring democratic states
in an economically and politically competitive global environment, the less
politicalsignificance supranational institutions will have in the process.
European integration has in fact already reached a degree, which demands new
theory in order to predict on the future process. I believe this theory should be statecentric, and it should account for democratic states’ interest in preserving the
democratic state per se while upholding transnational markets.
I find this notion to be supported by the fact, that the past 15 years or so have
shown, that European legislative procedures have been revised in favor of
intergovernmental settings on the one hand, and democratically elected supranational
officials on the other. The problem with the political executive function of the
Commission, which had been essential to the creation of the EEC, the EC and the
SEA, is, that officials are not elected, and is therefore unsustainable as soon as a
certain degree of integration has been achieved.
The process of European integration may indeed have started out as an elitist
enterprise led by powerful producers’ commercial interests, but it has become much
more than that. In my view it now represents an endeavour to save the democratic
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system and the balance of the enlightened European society, while competing
economically with politically incompatible states. There is no doubt, that the further
process will lead to political friction in all member states, and there will be
considerable external interest in sabotaging the project. New societal compromises in
Europe will fiercely be fought for in the streets and parliaments, and there will be
more elected and non-elected officials as much as interested actors blackmailing each
other in nightly sessions. Yet, I am confident, that European electorates will come to
the conclusion, that European leaders have come to before and on March 25, 2011,
namely, that the European future demands compromise in any case, and that
integration is without alternative.
Here is a set of assumptions that provide for solid predictive as much as
explanatory capacity:
Europeans want to live in peace and prosperity, they know, that it is not possible to
pursue that on their own, and they will find whatever form is necessary to accomplish
that, just because there is no alternative. In my view, it is that simple.Theory is one
thing, practice another, and European political leaders, especially in France and
Germany tend to be member state representatives and supranational agents at the
same time.
I quote Wolfgang Schaeuble, the current German Minister of Finance, and one of
the last surviving political grand figures deeply involved in the process of European
integration: "If we would not have European integration already, we would have to
invent it."
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